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This paper contributes to the aid eﬀectiveness debate by applying a vector autore-
gression model to a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries. This method avoids the
need for instrumental variables and allows one to analyse the impact of foreign aid on
human development and on economic development simultaneously. The full sample
results indicate a small increase in economic growth following a fairly substantial aid
shock. The size of the eﬀect puts the result somewhere between the arguments of aid
optimists and those of aid pessimists. Economic growth is found to respond more to
aid shocks in groups deﬁned by better economic policies, poor institutions and high aid
dependence. Human development, for which I use the growth rate of life expectancy
as a proxy, responds positively to aid shocks in democracies and in good institutional
environments.
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11 Introduction
For better or for worse, Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) is the main tool employed
by the rich world in its attempts to promote prosperity in the developing world. Given
the importance of this tool, it should not be a surprise that many scholars of development
consider it’s impacts worthy of study, particularly it’s impacts on economic growth. Unfor-
tunately, from a policy maker’s perspective at least, the approach taken by most of these
works has yielded ﬁndings across the full spectrum of potential results. The objective here is
to employ a diﬀerent method. A method that does not require as many (often controversial)
assumptions.
This paper estimates the impact of aid in a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) framework.
For the most part, the existing literature estimates standard growth regressions augmented
with aid terms on panel data and attempts to overcome the endogeneity problem between
growth and aid with standard instrumental variables techniques. The PVAR approach avoids
the need for instrumentation strategies as all variables in a PVAR are recognised to be
endogenous. Each variable is regressed on its own lags and those of the other variables.
Only a minimal set of assumptions is required to interpret the impact of shocks in each
variable on the system. Another merit of this notoriously atheoretical approach is that,
as both Easterly [2003] and Easterly, Levine, and Roodman [2004] point out, much of this
literature suﬀers from a lack of a formal theory linking aid and growth to guide applied
researchers in settling on an econometric speciﬁcation. As will be shown below, nothing
approaching a consensus has emerged from the literature and many key ﬁndings have been
found to be less than robust to changes in sample or speciﬁcation.
Vector autoregressions have been used by researchers to study the impact of foreign aid in
a particular country. For example, Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd [2005] examines the ﬁscal
eﬀects of aid in Ghana while Morrissey, M’Amanja, and Lloyd [2006] examines the impact
of ODA on growth in Kenya. While Hansen and Headey [2010] employs a PVAR model
to examine the short-run eﬀects of aid on net imports and spending, they do not examine
growth. This paper’s main contribution then is to expand on the work of Morrissey and his
co-authors by widening the scope via methods similar to those used by Hansen and Headey
[2010].
The secondary contribution of this paper is that the PVAR approach allows one to examine
“the other side” of development simultaneously. Taken as a whole, the foreign aid eﬀec-
tiveness literature is vast. While most of this literature looks at aid’s eﬀects on economic
development, there is a smaller, yet growing, body of work that look at aid’s impact on
human development as measured by variables such as the Human Development Index (HDI)
and the infant mortality rate. However, single equation techniques can only focus on one
issue at a time. It makes sense to make use of the multi-equation nature of a PVAR to ex-
2amine both aspects of development (very broadly deﬁned) simultaneously, as while GDP per
capita is a good measure of the overall state of a society (due to it’s high correlations with
things we actually do care about), it is far from perfect. Economic development is surely a
large part of the concept of “development” but there are other elements that matter.1
Interest lies speciﬁcally with the impulse response functions (IRFs) obtained from the model.
These will show the response path of economic growth and human development to a one
time shock in foreign aid holding all other shocks at zero. To reduce concerns about biases
that could arise from estimating the model without allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects, the sample is
restricted to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. These IRFs serve as the baseline results and it
is shown that these results are in line with GMM estimates which allow for country speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample is then split into groups deﬁned by economic policy, institutional
quality, democracy and aid dependence. This allows us to see if aid is more eﬀective in
certain environments.
Several important and policy relevant results emerge from the analysis. Firstly, aid shocks
do seem to induce economic growth in the ﬁrst few years following the shock. However,
this initial response is less than 1% extra growth per annum and is tempered by some
later negative responses. Secondly, aid appears to have a small positive impact on human
development, though the error bands do not allow us to rule out that the eﬀect is negative or
non-existant. In countries with good economic policy, the early impact of aid on economic
growth jumps to about 2%, though this is once again tempered by some negative responses
later on. In democracies, aid has a much larger impact on human development and a
less pronounced eﬀect on economic growth than in either the full sample or in autocracies.
Relative to countries with good institutions, those with poor institutional environments make
more use of aid in the economic sphere and less use of aid in terms of human development.
Finally, countries which are more dependent on aid see a better response in terms of both
economic and human development.
One of the main implications of these ﬁndings is that while aid does lead to economic growth,
the impact is not transformative and to maintain even an extra 1% of growth would require
frequent large injections of aid. Another is that while the response of GDP per capita growth
is higher in some environments, it is not so much higher that donors could justify focusing
all aid monies on countries with these characteristics. This is further supported by the fact
that often it is the case that when aid fails to have an impact on one of the dimensions of
development in one of the sub-samples, it impacts on the other.
1Other social sciences are at pains to make this point to economists, but I would argue that we already
know this. Certainly, the small but growing empirical literature on aid and human development (which is
outlined below), not to mention the work of Amartya Sen, shows that economists are aware of the multi-
dimensional nature of development.
3The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the existing literature.
Section 3 outlines the data and discusses issues of measurement. Section 4 describes the
econometric approach in detail. Sections 5 and 6 present the baseline and grouped results
respectively and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Existing Literature
There is an extensive literature that seeks to examine the impact of foreign aid on economic
growth and a smaller one that looks at aid’s impact on human development. Some studies
have found positive eﬀects, some conditional eﬀects and others no eﬀects. Given the wide
range of ﬁndings and the debates that they have prompted, it is worth examining some of
the relevant recent papers in brief.
2.1 Aid and Economic Development
There are many studies that have examined the eﬀect of aid on growth. I limit myself here
to the more recent work, both for brevity and because it highlights the issues that will be
examined in Section 6.2 Recent work has chieﬂy focused on conditional aid eﬀectiveness.
Burnside and Dollar [2000] reignited the aid eﬀectiveness debate when they found that
while aid has no eﬀect on growth on average, aid works in a good policy environment. They
include an aid*policy interaction term and ﬁnd that it is statistically signiﬁcant and robust to
a number of speciﬁcations. This paper launched the debate on conditional aid eﬀectiveness.
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman [2004] recreate the Burnside-Dollar dataset and expand on
it signiﬁcantly. By following the approach of Burnside and Dollar to the letter, they ﬁnd
that not only is the crucial aid*policy coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant but it has the opposite sign.
Easterly [2003] re-examines the issue in a diﬀerent way. By employing Oﬃcial Development
Assistance (ODA) as the measure of aid as opposed to the measure used by Burnside and
Dollar, Eﬀective Development Assistance (EDA), Easterly ﬁnds that the aid*policy interac-
tion term is no longer signiﬁcant.3 He also varies the speciﬁcation of good policy and again
ﬁnds that the aid*policy term is insigniﬁcant. The crucial interaction term is also found to
be insigniﬁcant by varying the deﬁnition of growth (Burnside and Dollar deﬁned growth as
real GDP growth over four years) to consider eight, twelve and twenty four years.
2Roodman [2007] provides an excellent overview of the entire literature and Deaton [2010] discusses the
potential problems with the IV strategies commonly employed in this area.
3As many authors note, the two measures are highly correlated. The two are fully deﬁned in the data
section below.
4One of the best examples of support for the Burnside-Dollar result comes from Collier and
Dollar [2002]. They expand the Burnside-Dollar dataset to include 349 aid-growth-policy
episodes as opposed to the original 275. The other modiﬁcation they make is to employ the
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as their policy variable.
Their ﬁndings agree with the Burnside-Dollar result.
However, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp [2004] question the suitability of the CPIA for growth
regressions. They include a climate*aid interaction term and ﬁnd that it is signiﬁcant. The
aid*policy term loses its signiﬁcance once climate*aid enters the speciﬁcation. They suggest
that the climate variable may be a proxy for deep determinants such as institutions. This
is a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent conditional eﬀectiveness result and one which will be examined in
Section 6. Given the sketch of the literature above, it will come as no surprise that the role
good policy has to play will also be investigated.
Svensson [1999] examines whether civil and political liberties play any role in aid eﬀective-
ness. He ﬁnds that an aid*democracy interaction term is highly signiﬁcant and that an
aid*policy term ` a la Burnside and Dollar is insigniﬁcant. It is important to note that he
considers, and rejects, the possibility that democracy is simply a proxy for good policies.
This suggests we should add democracy to our list of conditional results to be examined.
This sample of the aid and economic growth literature is chieﬂy included to motivate the
division of the sample into groups deﬁned by economic policy, institutions and democracy in
Section 6. However, it also shows that the traditional approach of running either standard
cross-sectional or panel growth regressions augmented with aid and aid interaction terms
leads to fragile results. Indeed, the title of Roodman [2007], “The Anarchy of Numbers:
Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics”, sums up the literature well. Each of the
papers is a ﬁne econometric work, and it may be that these factors do indeed matter, but
the fragility of the results is undeniable.4 The prospect of a fresh perspective is a major
motivating factor in employing the PVAR methodology.
2.2 Aid and Human Development
While nowhere near as extensive as that which concerns itself with economic development,
there is a small but growing literature that seeks to empirically assess the impact of foreign
aid on human development.
4Roodman examines seven leading papers in the aid-growth literature, (including Burnside and Dollar
[2000], Collier and Dollar [2002] and Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp [2004]) and ﬁnds that each of them is
susceptible to changes in the sample and in speciﬁcation.
5Kosack [2003] ﬁnds that aid has a positive eﬀect on HDI growth but only in democratic
countries. His estimates also suggest that aid will have a negative eﬀect on HDI growth
in autocracies. Interestingly, he ﬁnds that democracy alone has a negative eﬀect on HDI
growth. He interprets these ﬁndings as implying that ‘more-democratic poor countries have,
on their own, lower growth in the quality of life, but that aid to these countries may reverse
this negative tendency’ (p6).
McGillivray and Noorbakhsh [2007] examine the impact of aid on the level of the HDI and
allow conﬂict to enter the analysis. They ﬁnd that aid alone has a negative impact on HDI
scores but disagree with Kosack [2003] in that they do not ﬁnd either a negative eﬀect of
democracy on the HDI or a positive aid*democracy interaction term.5 These two studies
gives us a second reason to divide the sample along lines of democracy.
Using quantile regression, Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey [2005a] examine aid’s eﬀects on
human development as measured by both the HDI and the infant mortality rate. They argue
that while aid might not have a direct impact on welfare, it may have an indirect one via
pro-poor expenditures (PPE). By constructing a PPE index they ﬁnd that aid has a positive
impact on welfare through public expenditure and that the eﬀect is greater in countries with
lower welfare. They also argue that good economic policy is not required for aid to be
eﬀective in promoting human development. A related paper, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley,
and Verschoor [2005b], ﬁnds to the contrary that there is a direct impact of aid on human
development and little evidence of an indirect eﬀect via PPE. It is clear that there is nearly
as much disagreement and tendency for conﬂicting results in the aid-human development
literature as there is in the aid-growth literature.
There are of course more works that concern themselves with the eﬀects of aid on economic
and human development. However, the papers above provide a suﬃcient overview of the
evidence and suggest that it may be illuminating to examine whether aid has diﬀerent eﬀects
in groups of countries deﬁned by economic policy, institutional quality and democracy.
The ﬁnal division of the sample is inspired by Hansen and Headey [2010]. They utilise a
PVAR model to examine the short-run macro eﬀects of aid. They split the countries in their
sample into those that are highly dependent on ODA and those that are not. In the context
of the current work, it is plausible that there is some critical level of aid dependence under
which aid cannot be eﬀective. It is equally plausible that being overly dependent on aid
results in macro distortions.
5Rather they ﬁnd that aid and conﬂict have negative eﬀects on human development and that aid is no
more or less eﬀective in conﬂict situations.
63 Data
The data on yearly economic growth comes from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI).6 While economic growth is a concrete concept, the other two variables
that will be used in this analysis are somewhat nebulous. Thus, it is good practice to devote
a little time to deﬁning exactly what the “aid” and “human development” variables used in
the analysis actually are.
3.1 Measuring Aid
This paper uses the notation aidit to represent total net ODA per capita. This includes
ﬂows from all donors (as measured by the OECD) to recipient i at time t. aidit is measured
in constant 2007 US dollars.7 The data come from the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC).8 In choosing how to measure aid, one must make two important decisions.
Firstly, what counts as foreign aid? This eﬀectively boils down to the choice between
ODA and EDA. ODA is deﬁned on the OECD’s website as:
“Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients
(developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by
the oﬃcial sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as
the main objective; (c) at concessional ﬁnancial terms (if a loan, having a grant
element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to ﬁnancial ﬂows, technical co-
operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are
excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations
or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.”9
EDA is an adjustment to ODA that replaces the oﬃcial loans component with “the grant
equivalents of oﬃcial loans” and disregards grants that are tied to technical assistance.10
Although this may seem like an important modiﬁcation, the two are hugely correlated.11 I
choose to use ODA as the aim of the paper is to assess the impact of the West’s eﬀorts and
ODA is the tool they employ.
6The WDI can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
7Given that ODA contains concessional loans, these net ﬂows can be negative if the repayment of loans
are greater than new loans and grants.
8The data can be accessed at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data
9See www.oecd.org/dac/glossary
10Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven [1999].
11Dalgaard and Hansen [2001] show that the correlation between the two (as a fraction of GDP) in nominal
terms is 0.98 and between real EDA and nominal ODA it is 0.89. They also suggest that the diﬀerence
between the two measures “seems to be a simple transformation” (p26).
7The other issue one must decide on is how to normalise the aid variable. Many studies
express aid as a fraction of GDP. In my case this would lead to a mechanical relationship
between two of my main variables of interest - aid and economic growth. To avoid this, I
divide yearly aid data by yearly population data from the Penn World Tables. Thus, aidit
is fully deﬁned as total net ODA per capita.
3.2 Measuring Human Development
One also faces two issues when attempting to quantify human development (HDit). The
ﬁrst is ﬁnding an ideologically neutral measure. While some of us would consider low
levels of poverty or inequality to be good indicators of human development, others would
disagree. Claiming either of these variables as good proxies for human development requires
one to take an implicit ideological stance.12 Using democracy or measures of government
accountability is similarly unsatisfactory.
The second problem is the lack of suﬃciently long time series data relating to
human development. The UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) is equal parts economic
prosperity, education and life expectancy and is largely free of ideology.13 However, the series
is not of suﬃcient length to be usable in an analysis such as this.
I consider life expectancy to be an ideologically clean proxy for human development. While
there are other aspects to human development, a long lifespan is essential to pursue many
of them. The data series, which again comes from the World Bank’s WDI, is of suﬃcient
length and covers a suﬃcient number of countries. The speciﬁc variable, denoted as HDit,
is the growth rate of total life expectancy at birth (in years).14
The data allows for a balanced panel of 31 countries over the period 1973-2005. The main
reason for the omission of 17 countries is GDP growth series that start too late. Some of
these data poor countries have very small populations and others had particularly turbulent
starts to their independence. The list of countries that are used in the analysis, along with
summary statistics, can be seen in Appendix A.
12Of course, if one set out to examine the impact of ODA on inequality or poverty then this issue of an
ideological bias does not arise.
13Though it is somewhat arbitrary in that it gives equal weight to each component. For more detail see
United Nations Development Programme [various years].
14I use the growth rate to minimize concerns about stationarity.
84 Econometric Approach
This paper is concerned with the IRFs associated with the following PVAR model:
Zit = α0 +
p X
q=1
βqZit−q + ǫit (1)
where Zit is the vector (aidit, growthit, HDit), α0 is a vector containing the constant terms,
βq is the matrix of coeﬃcients for lag q and ǫit is distributed as (0,σ2
i ) with E(ǫitǫ
′
is) = 0
for all t  = s.
This model can be viewed as the most restrictive possible in that it imposes common slopes
and common intercepts and can be estimated by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS). It
is well known that POLS yields biased and inconsistent estimates if the true data generating
process contains a ﬁxed eﬀect. To reduce such concerns, only countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa are considered. All countries are of course diﬀerent, but these countries should form a
suﬃciently homogeneous group to allow POLS estimates of the relationships between ODA,
economic growth and human development to be meaningful. Such concerns should be further
reduced by the division of the sample into the subgroups outlined above.
A less restrictive model is a dynamic panel data model with country ﬁxed eﬀects. Such a
model can be estimated via GMM techniques as is done by Love and Zicchino [2006]. This
approach will be used as a check on the main results.15
As it is not the reduced form disturbances of Equation (1) that we are interested in, we
need a method to recover the pure structural shocks. The most common way to obtain
orthogonalised shocks is to employ a Choleski decomposition which orders the shocks in a
sensible way. The channel of inﬂuence I impose is the following:
aidit → growthit → HDit
Aid shocks can impact on growth and human development contemporaneously; growth can
impact on human development contemporaneously but only inﬂuences aid ﬂows with a lag;
human development only operates on the other two variables with a lag. The choice of
15An even less restrictive variant of Equation (1) allows for both country speciﬁc intercepts and slopes.
Pesaran and Smith [1995] show that these sort of models can be estimated by applying the Mean Group
Estimator (MGE). This is the method adopted by Hansen and Headey [2010]. However, Rebucci [2003]
shows, using Monte Carlo simulations, that “the dispersion of the slope parameters around their mean
must be high in absolute terms for the heterogeneity bias of pooled estimators to be substantial” (p26). In
addition, the simulations indicate that for MGE to be a useful alternative, the time dimension of the panel
must be longer than that which is to be found in most macroeconomic datasets.
9ordering is a crucial factor in any VAR exercise.16 The rationale behind the chosen ordering
is as follows:
• Donor countries (especially their bureaucrats) need time to observe and react to
changes in the recipient country. Thus aid ﬂows will only respond to changes in
economic and human development with a lag.
• It takes time for increasing human development to translate into economic develop-
ment. It is much more plausible that economic growth can have a contemporaneous
eﬀect on human development.
While this is only one of six possible orderings, it seems the most plausible and the sensitivity
of the results to an alternative Choleski decomposition is examined in Appendix B. I follow
Love and Zicchino [2006] and Hansen and Headey [2010] and construct 95% conﬁdence
intervals using Monte Carlo Integration methods.17 Finally, to determine the apropriate
number of lags to include, that is the p in Equation (1), I employ standard information
criteria.
5 Full Sample Results
Both the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion indi-
cate that the model should include eight lags.
5.1 POLS
The IRFs obtained from the full sample of 31 countries can be seen in Figure 1. For
completeness I present all the IRFs from the system though interest only really lies with the
responses of the growth rates of GDP per capita and life expectancy to a shock in aid. Each
IRF shows the response path of the variable in question to a one time positive one standard
error increase in the estimate of the shock variable holding all other shocks at zero. The
values of the shocks can be read oﬀ the Y-axis of the diagonal elements of Figure 1 at time
zero. The aid shock is approximately $33 per person.
It is, however, reassuring that the none of the other IRFs display inexplicable behaviour.
Aid tends to decline following an economic growth shock and tends to increase following
a shock to the growth of human development. It is plausible that when donors see an
increase in economic growth they scale back aid but when they see some improvements in
16The importance of the ordering increases with the correlation between the reduced form innovations.
See Enders [2004] page 276.
17I use RATS’ “MONTEVAR” procedure which makes draws from an inverse Wishart distribution and
uses the Jeﬀery’s prior.










































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws.
human development they attempt to consolidate these gains. Economic growth is slightly
lower for a few periods following a shock to human development growth – perhaps due to
people switching from economic to leisure or other non-market activities – though the eﬀect
quickly dies out. Finally, a shock to economic growth increases the growth rate of human
development until about seven periods after the shock, at which point the growth of human
development is lower than it would have been. This is perhaps due to increased pollution or
other retarding inﬂuences that can arise from increased economic activity.
Turning to our main concerns, we can see that an aid shock at time zero has an immediate,
but small, positive impact on GDP per capita growth. This positive impact increases to
about 0.8% extra growth one period after the shock and the positive impact still exists in
period two. These short run increases in growth can be explained as increases in government
investment and perhaps consumption. The next three periods see growth that is lower than
it would have been in the absence of the initial aid shock. A plausible explanation for this is
11that recipient governments treat the aid shock at time zero as a permanent increase and are
taken by surprise when it proves to be transitory.18 After this we see a return to a positive
response. This would ﬁt with government investments on infrastructure made with the initial
aid shock paying oﬀ. After the 10th step the initial shock has no more inﬂuence. The error
bands are generally tight enough for us to have conﬁdence in the estimated response path.
So is aid eﬀective in terms of generating economic growth? Given the results of Figure 1,
one would have to say yes. The positive responses to aid seem to outweigh the periods where
growth is lower than it would have been. However, there are two important issues one should
bear in mind:
1. The extra injection of $33 per person is not cheap. Even at this level, the results don’t
ﬁt the description of transformative.
2. Given that the eﬀects die out by the 11th period, can we say that the induced economic
growth is sustainable?
These results thus sit somewhere between the arguments of aid optimists and aid pessimists.
Yes aid seems to be eﬀective in that it does induce some economic development, but to make
it a promising tool for eliminating global poverty it would need frequent large injections.
So are the results in terms of human development more supportive of aid advocates? Not
really. The estimated response path is positive for the most part but very small in magnitude.
That said, the human life span is measured on a (sadly) small scale so an increase in its
yearly growth rate of even a fraction of a percent may be quite good, especially given that
the response persists until the 10th period following the initial shock. However, the error
bands allow for the possibility that the impact may be negative. The results in this respect
are thus ambiguous.
5.2 Robustness: GMM
It is important to check if the baseline results are robust to allowing for country speciﬁc
eﬀects i.e. if the POLS approach gives diﬀerent results to a model that allows for ﬁxed
eﬀects. To do this, I employ the PVAR Stata program written by Inessa Love. For speciﬁc
details of the procedure, I direct the reader to Love and Zicchino [2006]. Brieﬂy, the estimator
allows for country ﬁxed eﬀects which are removed by forward mean diﬀerencing. The model
is then estimated by GMM.
18They may not be entirely wrong in this as Figure 1 shows that the response of aid to its own shocks
persists beyond ﬁfteen periods, though it does drop rapidly to roughly a third of the value of the shock.
12Figure 2: Full Sample IRFs: GMM
Impulse−responses for 6 lag VAR of aid growth hd
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte−Carlo with 2500 reps
response of aid to aid shock
s
 (p 5) aid  aid




response of aid to growth shock
s
 (p 5) growth  growth




response of aid to hd shock
s
 (p 5) hd  hd




response of growth to aid shock
s
 (p 5) aid  aid




response of growth to growth shock
s
 (p 5) growth  growth




response of growth to hd shock
s
 (p 5) hd  hd




response of hd to aid shock
s
 (p 5) aid  aid




response of hd to growth shock
s
 (p 5) growth  growth




response of hd to hd shock
s
 (p 5) hd  hd




Notes: Each panel shows the response of the indicated response variable to a one standard deviation shock in the shock variable.
Results obtained using the PVAR program kindly made available to me by Inessa Love.
Inessa Love’s PVAR program will not allow me to obtain error bands for models with more
than six lags. The results are presented in Figure 2 while the results of a model with eight lags
(with no error bands) can be found in Appendix C. The IRFs only trace out the responses
to six periods after the initial shock and use a slightly diﬀerent value for the shocks, but we
can immediately see that the pattern of responses to an aid shock are very similar to those
obtained using POLS. The aid shock is smaller yet it generates a larger, though still rather
small, response in the growth rate of human development and the economic growth response
is roughly 50% of the POLS outcome. However, the results of the eight lag GMM model
show a similar level of response to that of the POLS model. The error bands are also wider
in the case of the economic growth response, though the bulk of the error band lies above
zero. Overall we can be conﬁdent that POLS is a satisfactory method and that the results
presented in Figure 1 are valid.
136 Conditional Results
To investigate whether aid works in certain environments, that is conditionally, previous
authors in this literature have included interaction terms in their speciﬁcations. While one
could do likewise in the VAR framework, the interpretation of shocks in these multiplicative
terms would be diﬃcult and the extra terms would have to be made to ﬁt into a Choleski
decomposition. I take a simpler alternative approach and merely run the model over groups
deﬁned by certain characteristics.
6.1 Good Versus Bad Economic Policy
Given how inﬂuential the Burnside-Dollar result has been in donor circles, it makes sense
to use the model to see if we can ﬁnd evidence of aid working better in a good policy
environment. One lesson to be taken from the literature is that often the deﬁnition of good
policy is somewhat arbitrary in what is included and once it is changed the signiﬁcant results
disappear. With this in mind, I have chosen the most objective measure of economic policy
that I have come across. The World Bank’s Doing Business project collects information
across a wide variety of aspects of the business environment and ranks countries on the overall
ease of doing business. The full methodology can be found on the project’s website.19 Here,
it is suﬃcient to note that the surveys are as objective as possible and cover most aspects
of a country’s business environment. Thus, the ranking should provide a good proxy for
overall economic policy. This is quite a diﬀerent measure of policy from the weighted indices
of macroeconomic indicators that are commonly used in this literature.
I use the most recent rankings as my measure. While this is open to criticism, the data only
goes back to 2004 and additional important variables have been added over time. I believe
that the data can safely be regarded as a good measure of a country’s stock of economic
policies. I consider a country with a ranking in the top 100 to have good economic policy.
Countries below this, admittedly arbitrary, cutoﬀ form the bad policy sample. A beneﬁt of
dividing the sample this way is that even if we would see countries move around somewhat
in the rankings over time had we the data, such broad ranges make it more likely that they
remain within the bounds I have set for good and bad policy. In any event, the cutoﬀ would
have to be much more forgiving for many more countries to make into the good sample.
Figures 3 and 4 presents the IRFs obtained from running the model on each of the policy
groups. It will come as no surprise that only ﬁve countries made the cut for good policy.20
I continue to include eight lags in the model over all samples.
19http://www.doingbusiness.org
20Appendix A shows which countries are in this and each subsequent sub-sample.




































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries which rank in the top 100 in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking.
The results are not as precise as those of Section 5 but are striking nonetheless. It is worth
noting that the magnitude of the aid shock in both cases are very similar. In the good
policy group, economic growth is actually lower than it would have been at t=0 absent the
aid shock. However, by t=1 growth is roughly 2% higher than it would have been. We see
the same pattern of negative response that we saw in the full sample after t=2 with some
small postitive responses after t=5. While the error bands do not allow one to discount
the possibility that these long lasting eﬀects are negative, they were not present in the full
sample results. The bad policy sample responses are markedly diﬀerent and (not surprisingly
given that these countries form the vast majority of the full sample) are similar to the full
sample results. The level of response is smaller though and we see some long lasting negative
responses that were absent in the full sample.









































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries which rank outside of the top 100 in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking.
In terms of human development, the error bands are too broad to draw much inference. In
the bad policy group the estimated eﬀect is indistinguishable from zero for the most part.
In the good policy group the error bands are also too wide but we can see initial negative
responses. After that we cannot say with any certainty what sign the eﬀect takes.
These results suggest that, in terms of increasing GDP per capita growth, aid does work
better in a good policy environment. However, I would argue that it still does not reach
the level of transformative power that aid advocates claim. A 2% boost to economic growth
is certainly impressive but once again it is not cheap and is tempered by some negative
responses. On the other hand, the results certainly do not conform to the arguments of
the most despairing of aid pesimists in that we see some beneﬁcial impact of aid, even in
countries with bad policy.











































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample composed is of
those countries with an average value of 0 or higher in the Polity IV index of political regime characteristics.
6.2 Democracy Vs. Autocracy
We saw in Section 2 that there is evidence that being a democracy matters for both dimen-
sions of aid eﬀectiveness. To examine this issue, I utilise the measure of democracy created
by the Polity IV project. This variable combines information on democratic and autocratic
features of a country and places them on a scale from −10 (hardcore autocracy) to +10
(hardcore democracy). This suggests a simple division of the sample. Countries with an
average Polity score (over the sample period) less than 0 are consigned to the autocratic
group. Those with a score of 0 or higher form the democratic group.
Figures 5 and 6 shows the IRFs for both sub-samples. As was the case with the bad policy
group, the autocracy group forms the vast majority of the full sample and it is therefore
unsurprising that the IRFs are very similar to the baseline results. The big diﬀerence is







































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with a negative average value in the Polity IV index of political regime characteristics.
that we see no appreciable positive impact of aid on human development. Turning to the
democratic sample, we see a relatively large response of human development to an initial
aid shock. Not only is it relatively large, it is positive and persists to the 11th step. As
the shocks are once again of very similar magnitudes, this result partially supports the
ﬁndings of Kosack [2003] – aid seems to work in terms of promoting human development
only in democratic countries but we cannot see any clear evidence of it retarding human
development in autocracies.
In terms of aid’s impact on economic growth, as noted above, the autocratic sample’s re-
sponse path is very similar to that of the full sample. The major diﬀerence is the late negative
responses that were absent in the full sample. The response path in the democratic sample
has error bands that are too wide to draw any ﬁrm inference for the most part, though the
initial responses seem to be positive. While these initial positive responses are smaller than





































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with an average score of 3 or higher in the Polity IV constraints on executive power index.
those in the autocratic sample, they last longer. After that, it is generally not possible to
make any inference about the sign of the response. These results, therefore, do not conform
with Svensson [1999] in that aid does not seem to be more eﬀective in promoting economic
growth in democratic environments.
6.3 Good Vs. Bad Institutions
The next division of the sample is inspired by Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp [2004], who, as
we noted in Section 2, argue that deep determinants of a society may play a big role in
making aid eﬀective. They point speciﬁcally to institutional quality. This has enormous
intuitive appeal – good institutions should lead to a well ordered and stable society which
in turn should lead to an eﬀective use of resources such as foreign aid.






































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with an average score of less than 3 in the Polity IV constraints on executive power index.
To investigate, I divide the sample using a standard measure of institutional quality. The
Polity IV dataset contains a variable which quantiﬁes the constraints on the power of the
executive along a seven point scale. I deﬁne countries with an average value over the sample
period of three or higher as possessing good institutions. This is inescapably and unavoidably
arbitrary to some degree, but the deﬁnition of point three on the scale suggests it is a valid
cutoﬀ point.21
21“Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on
the executive.” Marshall and Jaggers [2008].
20Figures 7 and 8 presents the results which suggest that good institutions do not lead to more
eﬀective aid in terms of economic growth.22 In fact, the IRF shows very little response of
economic growth to aid. Bad institutions on the other hand, seem to yield better economic
growth responses to aid in the early periods following the aid shock. Compared to the base-
line results, the initial response of economic growth is nearly twice as big. As in the baseline
case, this is tempered by some negative responses after period two: negative responses which
are likewise larger than in the baseline case. We can also see that there are some marginal
negative responses after t=10 that persist until t=15. Overall, the responses of economic
growth to aid, both positive and negative, are larger in the bad institution sub-sample.
The story is quite diﬀerent when we turn to human development. In good institutional
environments, we see a higher level of response than in the full sample and the error bands
are more supportive of a positive response. In the bad institutions sample, the response is
similar to the baseline results, though we see early negative responses.
Why might it be the case that bad institutional environments get more economic bang for
their aid buck and less in terms of human development? As noted above, common sense
would suggest that aid works best along both dimensions in good institutional environments.
One possibility is that as they are not as constrained by legislatures representing the popular
will and thus can concentrate the aid monies in a few large scale national projects rather
than having many small scale local ones. This is mere speculation and highlights the biggest
drawback of the PVAR approach – while we can see outcomes quite well, the mechanisms
are completely obscured.
6.4 High Vs. Low Aid Dependence
The ﬁnal division is along lines of aid dependency. There are no ﬁrm theoretical reasons to
do so, but there are some plausible mechanisms that could relate aid eﬀectiveness to the level
of aid dependency. It could be that a certain level of aid relative to the size of the economy
is needed for its eﬀects to be substantial. On the other hand, it could be that high aid
dependence fosters corruption, retards reform and induces other such harmful behaviours.
There are also issues of absorption that may induce macroeconomic problems which could
limit aid eﬀectiveness. These positive and negative potential consequences of the level of aid
dependence are not necessarily mutually exclusive. One eﬀect may temper the other or they
could operate on diﬀerent time scales.
22This result is supported if one uses the World Bank’s Rule of Law (RL) variable as the measure of
institutional quality. The Polity variable is preferred as RL is only available for relatively recent years.
The results in terms of human development are quite diﬀerent however, with neither group showing much
response. Results available on request.




































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with an average nominal aid to nominal GDP ratio of 15% or higher.
While a PVAR model cannot get at these mechanisms, it would be interesting if we could
observe outcomes consistent with these arguments. There is no ﬁrm deﬁnition of aid depen-
dence. I take any country with an average nominal aid to nominal GDP ratio of 15% or
greater to be aid dependent. Once again this is somewhat arbitrary but 15% is a large slice
of any economy and the mean across the full sample was approximately 12%.
Figures 9 and 10 show the results. The top set are for the aid dependent countries and the
bottom set for the remainder. For the most part the results in terms of aid and economic
growth are very similar to what we saw in the full sample: an aid shock induces economic
growth in the early periods in both cases followed by lower growth in the next few periods
with a ﬁnal positive spike before tapering oﬀ. There are some diﬀerences worthy of note.
Compared to both the full sample and the less dependent sample, the level of the early
positive responses in the highly dependent countries are somewhat higher and the subsequent





































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws. The sample is composed of
those countries with an average nominal aid to nominal GDP ratio of less than 15%.
negative responses are not as severe. Perhaps most interestingly, the responses after t=10
in the highly dependent sample are negative. In the baseline case, there was no further
response after this point. In the low dependence group, we can see some small positive
induced growth persisting until the 15th period. While the model oﬀers no explanation for
these diﬀerences, it is interesting nonetheless to see them in the data. The higher responses
in the dependent sample suggests that the ﬁrst “hypothesis” above may hold. Likewise the
negative eﬀects that become apparent only in the dependent sample could be consistent with
behavioural changes (such as corruption or postponed reform).
With regards to human development, in the highly dependent sample, an aid shock increases
the growth rate of human development in a similar way as in the full sample, while aid shocks
tend to lower the growth of human development in the less dependent sample. However, the
error bands are in both cases are too broad for ﬁrm inference.
237 Conclusions
This paper has been an attempt to look at whether aid is eﬀective using a diﬀerent approach
to that found in the existing literature. Given the range of contradictory ﬁndings on this
question, no single work can claim to be deﬁnitive. However, the approach taken here is free
from many of the diﬃculties encountered by the usual panel approach. In particular, the
PVAR method does not rest on the oft maligned instrumentation strategies used in much of
the previous work.
The results lie somewhere between the ﬁndings and arguments of aid pessimists and aid
optimists. Aid does seem to work in terms of generating economic growth but not to an
extent that could be called transformative. The time path of the responses in most samples
showed that the early success of aid is mitigated by some later negative responses before
a recovery and eventual petering out. Evidence was also presented that suggests that this
impact is more pronounced in countries with good economic policy. Aid does not seem to
be more eﬀective at promoting economic development in democracies but does appear to
work better, at least initially, in what would commonly be regarded as poor institutional
environments. Economies that are relatively dependent on aid show lower negative responses
for the most part but small negative responses in later periods that one does not observe in
the less dependent sample.
The results for human development were generally ambiguous but suggest that aid may
induce small increases in the variable used as a proxy for human development, the growth
rate of life expectancy at birth. This increase was larger and unambiguous in democracies
and we also saw a fairly unambiguous positive response in good institutional environments.
Aid dependent countries see positive responses while the rest show a negative impact.
The major failing of the PVAR method is that it oﬀers no insight into what the underlying
mechanisms generating these results might be. That said, much of this literature is based
on ad-hoc speculation and econometric speciﬁcations. The beneﬁt of the approach is that,
as other VAR advocates point out, it lets the data speak for itself. In this case the data
seem to be making two points:
1. Aid works in general but not all that well.
2. Aid seems to work better in terms of economic growth in some environments, but not
to such an extent that it would be sensible to focus aid only on countries with those
characteristics. It is often the case that when we see aid failing to stimulate economic
growth in one of our groupings, we see it causing human development growth and vice
versa.
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26A Summary Statistics and Sub-Sample Allocation
Table 1: Means of Variables Used
Country Growth rate of Growth rate of ODA ODA as a Doing Business Constraints on Polity Democracy
Life Expectancy GDP per capita per capita percentage of GDP Rank Executive Power Score
Benin 0.777 0.466 64.527 9.782 172 3 -1
Botswana -0.273 6.017 172.829 5.911 45 6 7
Burkina Faso 0.635 1.849 66.388 12.909 147 2 -4
Burundi 0.330 -0.234 56.202 18.623 176 1 -4
Cameroon 0.236 1.141 57.082 4.013 171 2 -6
Central African Republic 0.179 -1.220 78.300 12.041 183 2 -3
Chad 0.201 1.547 56.652 11.874 178 1 -4
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire 0.393 -1.497 57.644 4.103 168 2 -6
DR Congo 0.215 -3.783 26.721 8.449 182 1 -5
Gabon 0.631 0.784 167.456 1.790 158 1 -7
Gambia 0.849 0.567 119.769 20.230 140 4 3
Ghana 0.383 0.176 46.631 7.648 92 3 -2
Guinea-Bissau 0.663 -0.149 149.697 40.479 181 3 -3
Kenya -0.052 0.292 44.148 6.366 95 3 -4
Lesotho -0.317 3.016 102.086 17.163 130 3 -2
Liberia 0.696 -3.229 75.870 24.116 149 2 -3
Madagascar 0.837 -1.480 48.313 9.553 134 4 0
Malawi 0.630 -0.037 57.742 18.609 132 2 -4
Mali 0.671 1.478 79.681 16.654 156 3 -1
Mauritania 0.462 -0.226 223.875 22.284 166 3 -7
Niger 0.785 -1.421 67.676 13.665 174 3 -2
Nigeria 0.417 0.469 4.306 0.616 125 3 -2
Rep. Congo -0.129 1.383 122.089 6.590 179 2 -5
Rwanda 0.247 1.562 75.300 18.995 67 1 -6
Senegal 0.716 -0.034 110.040 10.127 157 4 0
Sierra Leone 0.686 -0.226 50.235 15.077 148 3 -4
Sudan 0.596 1.961 47.863 4.874 154 2 -5
Swaziland -0.268 2.596 94.583 4.823 115 1 -10
Togo 0.593 -0.414 69.909 9.487 165 1 -5
Zambia -0.463 -1.498 111.299 15.371 90 3 -3
Zimbabwe -0.882 -1.099 42.201 3.500 159 4 -2
Notes: Except in the case of Doing Business Rank, values are means over the period 1973-2005. The Doing Business data comes from
the 2010 issue. To be included in the good policy sample a country must place in the top 100 in the 2010 Doing Business rankings.
The democratic sample contains countries with an average Polity democracy score of 0 or higher. The good institutions sample is
populated by countries with an average constraints on executive power score of 3 or more. Aid dependent countries are defined as
those with an average aid as a percentage of GDP in excess of 15%.
27B Robustness: Alternative Choleski Decomposition











































































































Notes: Each IRF depicts the response of the row variable to a one standard error shock in the estimate of the column variable. The
upper and lower lines are 95% error bands generated using Monte Carlo simulation with 2500 draws.
As mentioned in the main text, the Choleski decomposition chosen is only one of six possible
orderings. While I believe that the restrictions are valid, it is worth while to point out that
the results are nearly identical if one uses the next most sensible, and quite diﬀerent, ordering.
In particular, let us endow donor agencies with quicker reﬂexes and restrict aid so that it
requires at least one period to have an eﬀect. The ordering is thus:
growthit → HDit → aidit
Given that the recovery of the structural shocks hinges on the choice of ordering, this is
an important check on the robustness of the results. Figure 11 shows that, apart from the
imposed restrictions on contemporaneous impacts, the IRFs are for all intents and purposes
identical to those found using the preferred ordering.
28C Robustness: Eight Lag GMM Estimates
Figure 12: Full Sample IRFs: GMM
Impulse−responses for 8 lag VAR of aid growth hd













































Notes: Each panel shows the response of the indicated response variable to a one standard deviation shock in the shock variable.
Results obtained using the PVAR program kindly made available to me by Inessa Love.
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